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. IN THE SUPREME . COURT·~-~
OF ·c·THE. STATE OF UTAH
.

.

In the· Matter. of the· ESTAT·E ·oF .
· MAUDE K. BARLOW, also known
. .. · ···
as MAUD·E KARREN RICHAR.DS Case No. 8682
and MAUDE K .. RICHARDS~
Deceased.

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF~
MAUDE KARREN RICHARD·S,
. Case No. 8683
Deceased.
SHELDON R. BREWSTER, AUDREY
,: B. ·BELL, HOYT W. BREWSTER,
:- · KYLE H. BREWSTER, and LAEL
B. GEE,
Plaint~ffs and Respondents,

Case No.· 8825

-vs.WILLIAM BARLOW, et al.,
Defendants an-d Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS, IN CASE NO. 8682 AND 8683 AND
PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS IN
CASE NO. 8825

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for Hoyt ~ W. Br~wster, et al., have made.
a statement of facts in their initial brief, therefore nq
1
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further statement as such is appropriate here. However,
it should be restated that it is not determined whether
Ben S. Brewster and Maude Karren Richards were
marred subsequent to their having executed the reciprocal wills and agreement on February 7, 1939. The
pre-trial order, Case No. 8825, specifically found that
there existed this issue of fact (R. 62).
Errors and unjustified inferences with respect to
the facts as stated by respondent "~ be discussed in
the argument which follows.

POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
A SUBSEQUENT l\iARRIAGE BETWEEN BE N S.
BREWSTER AND MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS WOULD
NOT REVOKE THE WILL OF BEN S. BREWSTER, WHERE
THE LATTER HAD MADE PROVISION FOR MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS IN HIS WILL.
POINT II.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NO BAR TO THE CIVIL
ACTION COMMENCED BY HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL.
POINT III.
THE WILL AND AGREEMENT OF l\fAUDE KARREN
RICHARDS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS SUPPORTED
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.
POINT IV.
THE RECIPROCAL WILL OF MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS WHICH IS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, SHOULD
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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,HAVE !.BEEN: ADlWITTED ' .TO P.ROBATE·_,RA-THER TH~A;N
THE L~~ER OLOGRAPHIC WILl-s,. AND;:,LE.TT$R~~ T~~'fA
MENTARY ·sHOULD Ii'AVE ISSUED ··To· HOYT ..W. BREW:STER. >. ·:· '... .
.
. .
. .
. .. ,
.
. f.·
.·
.• · .
1

J· • •

.'1'

I~

POINT V.

.· T·HE .ACTION OF HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL., FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE RECIPROCAL WILL
AND CONTRACT OF FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS NOT PREMATURE.:.·
POINT VI.
IN POINT IV OF HIS REPLY BRIEF, BARLOW HAS
MISCONSTRUED THE RECIPROCAL. WILL .AND AGREEMENT OF MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, AND HAS MISCONSTRUED THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE COURT WHICH CORRECTLY GRANTS
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE SAID WILL AND
AGREEMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE BETWEEN B E N S .
.BREWS:TER AND MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS WOULD
NOT .REVOKE THE WILL OF BEN S. BREWSTER, vVHERE
THE LATTER HAD MADE PROVISION FOR MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS IN HIS WILL .

. s·ection 74-1-25 U.C.A., 1953, does not reqtiire that
a bequest to a woman who later becomes the wife of· a
testator appear on its face to be in contemplation of
marriage to prevent a revocation of a 'viii.
This: iss~e conc~rns the validity of the will of Ben
S.. Brewster dated February 7, 1939. William Barlo"v
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~ays

that Ben S. Bre,vster's will 'vas revoked by a subsequent marriage of Ben S. Bre,vster and ~laude Karren
Richards (8825, R. 61) and that thereby ~faude Karren
Richards was free to execute another will 'vhich she in
fact did. See Point II of Barlo,v's brief.
The question of the Inarriage of Ben S. Brewster
and 1Iaude Karren Richards is not resolved. Counsel
for Barlow on page 13 of his brief says that the trial
court by its judgment (8825, R. 89) found that such
marriage existed. Such is not the case. The court \vas
merely h"olding that a marriage, if it occurred, \\t·ould
not revoke the 'vills. At the pre-trial of the case the
court specifically found that the question of marriage
'vas a factual iten1 to he detern1ined (8825, R. 62).
Hoyt Bre,vster, et al., contended that even if Ben
S. Brewster and ~faude Karren Richards "~ere 1narried
subsequent to the execution of the reciprocal 'vills, the
reciprocal 'vill of Ben S. Bre,vster "vas not revoked by
virtue of said Sec. 74-1-25 U.C.A., 1953, because :Jiaude
Karren Richards 'vas provided for therein. See Point
No. 1 of the initial brief of Hoyt \V. Bre,,,.ster, et al.
However, should the court rule that such a n1arriage,
if it occurred, would have revoked the "ill, the judgn1ent
of the trial court should still be affir1ned for the reasons
set forth in Points II through , . . of the initial brief.
The case of In Re Poisrs Estate. :2SO P. (:2d) 789,
(Cal. 1955), relied upon by Barlo"·, has been analyzed
jn detail. See page 13, et seq., of the initial brief..A.s
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pointed out, the case is not controlling here and should
not be followed.
As further authority for the proposition that Ben
S. Brewster's will was revoked, counsel cites In Re
Scolpino's Will, 248 N.Y.S. 634, and In Re Anderson's
·Estate, 131 P. 975 (Ariz. 1913). See Barlo'v brief, p. 17.

In Re Anderson's Estate, supra, involved a statute
silnilar to Section 74-1-25 U:C.A., 1953, but there the
silnilarity ends, for the court specifically noted that
the one who became the testator's wife was not "provided
for in the will, nor mentioned therein." In the instant
case, as pointed out above, Maude Karren Richards 'vas
provided for in the will of Ben S. Bre,vster (Ex. 2).
The case is obviously not in point and rather than
helping Barlo,v, infers that had Anderson's widow been
"provided for in the will" it 'vould not have been revoked.
In Re Scolpino's Will, supra, decided many years
ago by one of the lower courts of the State of N e'v York,
~s contrary to the position contended for by Hoyt W.
Brewster, et al. However, the courts in New York at that
time were not at all consistent. For example, see the
case of In Re Neufeld's Will, 260 N.Y.S. 302. In that case
the will was held not to be revoked even though there
was no indication in the 'viii itself that a bequest to
a certain lady was in contemplation of 1narriage. The
testator later married the woman provided for and the
will was held not to be revoked. Also in the case of
In Re Gaffken's Will, 188 N.Y.S. 852, affirn1ed 135
N.E. 971, the will was not revoked by the subsequent
marriage, even though the "rill expressed no contempla-

5
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tion of marriage bet,veen the testator and the one provided for. It is true that in these two latter cases the
court considered some evidence outside of the "\vill as
suggesting that there might possibly have been a contemplation of marriage. However, because it was recognized that the status of the law in Ne'v York \vas so
confused by the courts, the Comn1ission in 1931 recommended an amendment to the statute. An amend1nent
to the New York statute did result and the amended
~tatute now reads:
~'If

after making any will, said testator marries, and the husband or wife survives the testator, such will shall be deemed revoked as to
such survivor, unless provision shall have been
made for such survivor by an anti-nuptial agreetnent in writing . . ." Book 13, Decedent Estate
Law, ~1cKinney's Consolidated La,vs of New
York, Ann., Art. 2, par. 35.
The general state1nents fron1 97 C.J.S., Sec. 1366
(d), p. 299, and 95 C.J.S. Sec., 291 (:2), p. 76, are too
general and are not applicable to the instant case. As
a matter of fact the latter state1nent cites as supporting
authority the case of In Re Ande-rson's Estate, supra,
distinguished above .
.!\..side fron1 the question of the effect on Ben S.
Brewster's reciprocal \Yill of a possible subsequent Inarriage to ~{aude 1\::arren Richards, there is no doubt
that \vhen an agreen1ent for the exeeution of reciprocal
'vills exists the san1e "rill be enforced in a court of
equity. See 169 A.L.R. 1, 55 and 97 (:.J.S., \\Tills~ See.
1366. rPhis principal of la\v \Vas not even 1uade an issue
'6
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at the pre-trial (8825, R. 60-61). It is conceded to be the
law by counsel for Barlo'v (8623, R. 21).
POINT II.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NO BAR TO THE CIVIL
ACTION CO·MMENCED BY HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL.

In Point III of his brief, counsel for Barlo'v makes
a unique and feeble argument regarding the applicability
of the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 25-5-1, et seq., U.C.A.,
1953. Some point is made of the fact that the reciprocal
wills and agreement did not contain an actual statement whereby the parties agreed not to revoke the wills.
If not expressed, it is obviously implied that the agreement and the reciprocal wills would not be revoked. This
is elementary.
Such an argument is totally without merit. In paragraph VIII of Maude Karren Richards' ·vvill (Ex. 1)
and in paragraph XI of. Ben S. Bre,vster's will (Ex.
2), it is stated that the wills are made purs'uant to
written agreement and in accordance therewith. Each
reciprocal will is stated to be in consideration for the
other. The written agreen1ent is part of Ex. 1.

issue

While this
was raised in Barlow's amended
answer, the pre-trial order is silent about such a contention on· the part of Barlow (8825, R. 60-61) and
counsel's brief below never mentioned it (8825, R. 63-71).
The novel argument of counsel is grasping at stra-\vs to
say the least.

Ward v. Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P. (2d) 635, in no
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

wise resen1bles the instant case, nor do the other cases
cited by counsel on this point. The Statute of Frauds,
Sec. 25-5-1, et seq., U.C.A., 1953, has been co1npletely
satisfied.
POINT III.
THE WILL AND AGREEMENT OF MAUDE KARREN
RICHARDS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS SUPPORTED
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.

As for the consideration and equities of the case,
Barlo,v,_ on pages 24-28 of his brief, has made son1e point
of the fact that Maude l{arren Richards only received
one-third of the Ben S. Brewster Estate and that Hoyt
W. ·Brewster, et al., are no'v seeking to obtain all of
the Maude Karren Richards Estate. Such a comparison,
of course, is utterly meaningless. If it is significant
at all, it should be pointed out that ~laude l{arren
Richards' distributive share under the Ben S. Bre,vster
will amounted to some $7,500. Such an amount appears
to be somewhere near the total value of the Maude
Karren Richards Estate. If this comparison is of any
consequence, then there is certainly no equity favoring
Barlow.
Counsel contends that Maude Karren Richards only
took under the Ben S. Bre~"ster "rill such part of his
estate as she would have been entitled to as his '\ri.dow.
This argument overlooks the fact that had !1aude l{arren Richards been in fact the '\\rife of Ben S. Bre,vster,
the latter would have had no obligation aside fron1 the
obligation under the contract, to leave her one-third
of his ent~re estate.
8
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Were there no such contract, and 'vere she insufficiently provided for, she could elect to take one-third
of the real estate in lieu of her distributive share under
the will. See Sec. 74-4-4 U.C.A., 1953. But the one-third
of the real estate might have been much less than onethird of the entire estate which ~faude l{arren Richards
did, in fact, receive..In addition thereto she, of course,
received one-half of the executor's fee.
Suffice it to say that there existed between l\:Iaude
Karren Richards and Ben S. Brewster an actual 'vritten
agreement containing mutual covenants and promises
between the parties, Ex. 1, and the executed vvills, Exs.
1 and 2, each executed in consideration for the other.
Mutual promises of the parties is sufficient consideration. Lawrence v. Ashba, 59 N.E. (2d) 568, (Ind. 1945),
97 ·C.J.S. Wills, Sec. 1367 (b) p. 302.
1faude Karren Richards received her distributive
share under the will of Ben S. Brewster vvithout raising
any question as to the validity of his vvill. It is only
equitable and in accordance with good conscience that
the provisions of Maude Karren Richard's will and the
agreement of February 7, 1939, no'v be enforced.
Even were it to be held that Ben S. Brewster's
will would be revoked by a subsequent marriage to
Maude Karren Richards, and even were it to be further
assumed that such a marriage occurred, still it could not
be successfully argued that the revocation of Ben S.
Brewster's will imposed by law would affect the agreement between the parties. His will would only be revoked
9
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as a will. The agreement would still stand .. ~laude KarI·en Richards having taken under the agreement, it cannot now be sensibly argued that there is a lack of consideration to support the enforcement of her reciprocal
will.
The net effect of allowing Barlow to prevail i~ this
case would be to allow him a windfall and permit him
to enjoy the benefits of both the Ben S. Brewster Estate
and Maude Karren Richards Estate to the exclusion
of rightful beneficiaries.
POINT IV.
THE RECIPROCAL WILL OF MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS WHICH IS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, SHOULD
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO PROBATE RATHER THAN
THE LATER OLOGRAPHIC WILL, AND LETTERS TESTAMENTARY SHOULD HAVE ISSUED TO HOYT W. BREWSTER.

Counsel for Barlow in Point No. 1 of his brief has
cited several authorities holding that "~here a party, after
having received benefits under a reciprocal "ill in his
favor, violates an agree1nent for reciprocal \Yills by executing a later revoking "\vill, the later \vill should be
admitted to Probate while the contract between the
parties should be enforced in equity. In Point \"'I of
the initial brief of Hoyt \\T. Bre"Tster, et al., \\Te adnritted
that the authorities have frequently so held.
However, though son1e courts have so held, there is
goo? authority for holding that the earlier reciprocal
\Vill is silnply irrevocable and that a later revoking 'vill

10
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should be denied admission to probate. In the case of
In Re Edwards' Estate, 120 N.E. (2d) 10 (1954), the
Supreme Court of Illinois affir1ned the trial court which
adn1itted to probate an earlier joint will and denied
probate of a later docu1nent purporting to be the last
'vill and testament of the same decedent. See also Jacoby
v. Jacoby, 96 N.E. (2d) 362 (Ill., 1950), and 97 C.J.S.,
Wills, Sec. 1366 (b), p. 296 and cases therein cited.
We reaffirn1 our argument set forth in Point \TI
of the initial brief and particularly invite the court's
attention to the exceptions to the general rule therein
noted. Where the total estate is affected by the prior
reciprocal will there is no substantial reason for admitting the later revoking 'viii to I>robate. All that 'vould
be probated is a "hollow shell."
There is no reason why, under such circu1nstances
as this, it should not simply be declared, as 'vas done in
the cases cited above, that the earlier 'vill is an irrevocable will; that the later will is invalid and adn1it the
earlier will to probate and thereby save considerable
time and expense and certainly the empty for1nality of
probating a will under which none of the estate \vill
pass.
We respectfully submit that notwithstanding the
rule that p r e v a i I s in some of the jurisdictions,
this Court should seriously consider establishing the
law in this State as herein contended for. Such a position is not without precedent and is certainly proper
'vhere Probate Courts such as ours, are clothed ""'ith
11
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an1ple authority. See Point \TI of the initial brief of
Hoyt \V. Brewster, et al.
POINT

·v.

THE ACTION OF HOYT W. BREWSTER, ET AL., FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE RECIPROCAL WILL
AND CONTRACT OF FEBRUARY 7, 1939, IS NOT PREMATURE.

Counsel for William ~Iuir Barlo'v makes the general
statement on page 12 of his brief, under Point I, that
Hoyt W. Brewster, et al., had no cause of action for
specific performance of the reciprocal will until the
Probate Court had denied its admission to Probate. Ko
such contention has heretofore been made by counsel
for Barlow and no specific authority is cited for the
broad general statement.
Where Maude Karren Richards toqk her distributive share under the will of Ben S. Bre,Yster, by the
very nature of her agreement 'Yith hil11, a cause of action
would arise in favor of the beneficiaries under the reciprocal will ilnn1ediately upon her death. Even before
death the rights of beneficiaries can be protected.
"There is substantial authority in support
of the po"'er of a court of equity to grant injunctive relief to restrain the surviv-ing party of
a contract to n1ake "'"ills 'vith 1nutual and reciprocal provisions fron1 conveying or transferring the pToperty in violation of the contract,
upon de1nand for such relief hy one 'Yho \Vould
be prejudicied by a breach of a contract.'' 169
A.I~.R,. 1, 59.

12
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In anticipation of this very argument, ho\vever, Hoyt
"\V. Bre\vster, et al., as soon as Willian1 Barlo\v had
been named executor of the later olographic \vill of
~laude l(arren Richards, filed an amended con1plaint
in Case No. 8825 (Civil action No. 107,499 belo\v), nau1ing
as defendants, runong others, "\V-illiarn Barlo\v, personally, and William Barlo\v, Executor of the Last \Vjll
and Testament of ~Iaude l(arren Barlo\v, etc. (8825, R.
38-41) The argument of counsel for vVilliau1 Barlo\v that
the ·Civil Action is preu1ature, con1pletely overlooked this
fact. All interested parties were before the Court in
the civil matter. The Court having jurisdiction of the
property \vas in a position to specifically enforce the
reciprocal \vill and agreement of ~laude Karren Ric-hards, dated February 7, 1939.
POINT VI.
IN POINT IV OF HIS REPLY BRIEF, BARLOW HAS
::\1ISCONSTRUED THE RECIPROCAL WILL AND AGREEMENT OF MAUDE KARREN RICHARDS DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1939, AND HAS MISCONSTRUED THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED BY THE CO·URT WHICH CORRECTLY GRANTS
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE SAID WILL AND
AGREEMENT.

In Point IV of his reply brief, Barlo\v has challenged
the propriety of the judg1nent entered by the Court in
the Civil Action, Case No. 8825.
So that there can be no nlisunderstanding as to
the applicable provisions of the reciprocal "~in of ~Iaude
Karren Richards and the judgment entered by the Court,
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the pertinent portions thereof are set forth below for
the convenience of the Court.
In paragraph II of her reciprocal will (Ex. 1),
Maude Karren Richards stated the follo\ving:
"I declare that I am the owner of the real
and personal property including the following described property :
"One insurance policy in the sum of
$1,000.00 in the West ·Coast Life Insurance
Company, payable to my estate.
"One insurance policy in the Business
1len's Assurance Company, in the sum of
$1,000.00 with double indemnity, payable to
my estate.
"Savings accounts with vValker Bank &
Trust Company, First Security Bank & Trust
Company and Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Company.
''l\Iy hon1e situated at 1346 Thornton
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
"Certain Inining stock in a
Company.

,.~ anadiun1

''Household furniture in Iny ho1ne at
1346 Thornton Avenue and also at 141 First
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
"'Certain personal

belongings.'~

In paragraph III of her said "~in, ~Iaude Karren
Richards provided for the pay1nent of funeral and burial
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expenses, etc., and in paragraph IV she bequeathed to
certain named relatives the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00).
Paragraph VI then provided

a~

follo\vs:

"'I hereby give, devise and bequeath all the
rest, residue and remainder of any and all my
estate both real and personal property whi~ch I
rnay own at the time of 'my death to Ben S.
Brewster of Salt Lake City, ·utah, if he survive
me and if the said Ben S. Brewster does not
survive me and 1ny brother l\1erton l{arren does
survive n1e, then I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my brother, Merton Karren, an a1nount
equal to one-sixth (1/6) part of nty estate exclusive of the amount my estate \vill be enhanced
in value by the distribution of the estate of Ben
S. Brewster. All the rest, ~residue and remainder
of my estate, both real and personal, in the event
Ben S. Brewster does not sttrvive 1ne, I hereby
give, devise and bequeath to the chi ldre11 of the
said Ben S. Brewster in equal part, share and
share alike, and if any of the said children of
Ben S. Brewster have died leaving issue, then
to their children by right of representation. In
the event that neither 1ny brother J.l1 erton J( arren
~nor Ben S. Brewster sttrvive me, then I hereby
devi'Se and bequeath the whole of my estate to the
children of the said Ben S. Brewster, as aforeJnentioned." (Emphasis supplied.)
1

The Court, in ease No. 8825 (Civil No. 107,499 helo\\')
entered judgment as follo\vs: (R. 89-90)
"\VHEREF,ORE, 11, IS 1-IEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
'"1. That the Motion for Sununary Judg1nent
of the defendant \Villia1n J\1: uir Barlo\v be and
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the same is hereby denied.
''2. That the ~Iotion for Summary Judgment
of the plaintiffs be and the same is hereby
granted.
''3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the reciprocal will of ~laude
ICarren Richards and the agreement between
l\1aude Karren Richards and Ben S. Brewster,
being pre-trial exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 insofar as
the same apply to any and all properties described in said exhibits or any and all assets of
the estate of l\Iaude Karren Richards.
~'-±.

That the plaintiffs be and they are hereby a'varded all of the estate of l\faude Karren
Richards, deceased, provided, ho,vever, that they
shall hold in trust such part thereof as may be
necessary to pay the creditors of ~faude Karren
Richards and the expenses of her last illness and
burial, as 1nay be determined by the Court in
Probate case No. 38411 (In the Matter of the
Estate of ~laude K. Barlo,v, also kno"\\TJl as
lVIaude Karren Richards, also lrno,,rn as ~laude
1{. Richards, Deceased), and to further hold in
trust one-sixth (1j6th) of the re1nainder of the
said estate for l\Ierton I~arren, if he ,,~ere living
at the date of the death of the said ~laude Karren
Richards.
'"5. IT IS
DECREED:

1

SPEC IFIC.A.I~Y

ORDERED .A.ND

(a) That the defendant ,,~illia1n Barlov{
deliver to the plaintiffs all of the proceeds he
1nay have reeeived fron1 the insurance policies
on the life of l\Iaude Karren Richards issued by
the vVest Co:u~t Life Insuranee Con1pany and the
Busi nessn1en \~ Assurance Con1pany, or fron1
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policies of insurance issued by the l{eserve Life
Insurance ·Company paying benefits for hospital
and n1edical expenses incurred by Maude Karren
Richards.
(b) That the defendant \Villian1 Barlow
deliver to the plaintiffs all moneys in any bank
account, "\Vhether held solely or jointly, in the
nan1e of l\1aude Karren Richards and specifically
any and all 1noneys withdra\vn by hiut fro1n any
such accounts since the death of l\1aude Karren
Richards, except as to any money contributed by
\Villiam Barlow.
(c) That the defendant \Villiant Barlo\v
deliver to the plaintiffs all properties of any kind
and nature located at the premises at 221 East
Fourth South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, at
the tirne of the death of the said l\iaude Karren
Richards, and any and all other personal or real
property of any kind or nature whatsoever and
wheresoever located that are a part of the estate
of Maude Karren Richards.
(d) That the proceeds of the following
described insurance policies be paid to the Clerk
of this Court for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs:
( 1) Policy No. 320549 and supplen1ental contract No. 1982, said policy being
issued by the West Coast Life Insurance Co.
upon the life of l\iaude Karren Richards and
dated October 10, 1931.

(2) Policy No. L-166920 issued by the
Business1nen's Assurance C o m p any of
America upon the life of Maude 1{. Richards.
~'Dated

this lOth day of Deee1nber, 1957.
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· "B~·Y·' TH.-E' r 1 or~R·
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·.

·~·-~~ ··. 1 ·.1L~~~~-~~:.:;J,·;

/s/ A. H. E~;L~T_T
District

. (~:_..

.. -

Judge~'.

Contrary to the contention of ·counsel (Barl~w-bfief~
p. 30), it is apparent that the reciprocal wiil·oi:·Maride
ltarr~n Richards does contain a general clause··:corl~eYi~g
''all the rest, residue and remainder," of her' estat'e<~ to
Ben S. B~e,vster and certain contingent be~eficia;ie~.
Barlow is only required in paragraph 5· (~) o~ _the
judgrrient, to deliver such proceeds from· the na~ed
insurance _policies as "he may have received.'' Counsel
for Barlow has again misconstrued the judgwent=(Barlow . hrie~, p. 28-29). If he received no such_ proceeds
then. he needn't worry. If he did, he shou14 _ forth'1th
deliver the same to Hoyt vV. Bre,vster et al:.:._:.

·;.· ·r·

--~

,_:_.;i!- ..-

Paragraphs 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the judg1rtent .,only
award to plaintiffs such 1noney and property as·b~longed
to Maude l{arren Richards. Barlow will never have to
give up any of his "hard earned dollars" and
th¢ sug.:.
- -gestion that future litigation n1ight be necessary·to ·ae~
termine which propertY: belonged to nlaude Karren Richards and which property belonged to Barlow only antici·pates Barlow's unwillingness to cooperate and surrender
that which the trial court has said he, in ·justice and
equity should.
"';"

.

.

•'

If it beco1nes necessary to in1plen1ent th-e judg1nent
of the trial court by appropriate suppleinental·remedies
such as appropriate Orders To ~ho\\~ Cause, etc.~ that
is of no concern at this thne to this Court.
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The .judgment as entered does nothing more than
specifically enforce the agreement entered into by ~en
S. Brewster and Maude Karren Richards on February
7, 1939, evidenced by the written agreement between the
parties and their reciprocal wills (Exs. 1, 2). It is just
and equitable in every respect. Barlow is not forced to
give up any money or property \vhich belongs to hiin
separately. While he \Vould like to obtain a windfall, it
is only just and equitable that the decree stand as entered
inasmuch as Maude Karren Richards has already received her p:ortion of the Ben S. Brewster estate as
provided in his will.
We will never know how much of her estate, enhanced by her share of the Ben S. Bre\vster Estate,
Inight have been dissipated while she was married to
Barlow. He seems to have been quite concerned about
her estate for it \vill be noted that Barlow and Maude
Karren Richards were 1narried August 25, 1952, (Ex.
D-2) and we find ~laude Karren Richards executing an
olographic will in his favor only 26 days later, on the
20th day of September, 1952. (8682, R. 1)
SUMMARY
It is the contention of Hoyt W. Brewster, et al.,
that the Agreement of Maude Karren Richards entered
into on February 7, 1939, with Ben S. Brewster, said
agreement being represented by an actual written document and a reciprocal will executed pursuant thereto
(Exhibits 1 and 2), should be specifically enforced, and
that the judgment of the trial court in the civil action
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below· (8825,. R .. 88-90): should he ;:affiritr~d~: .It- i~/ not
material that· Ben ·s. Brewster: ·m ·ms· reciprocal will:, m:
providing for Maude Karren Richards, made
menti.orr
of any contemplation of marriage.·
·

no·

.-

.

.

.-

·.

.

~

Section 74-1-26 U.C.A., 1953, does ·not require tha~
a· bequest to a woman who later . becomes the ·wife· ·of
a testator appear on its face to be in contenip~~tio~ ~of
marriage to prevent a revocation of the will. However~
should the Court hold to the contrary, then ·the said
agreement of Maude Karren Richards should still· be
specifically enforced, for William Muir Barlow. not. a
proper person to question the validity of the Brewstet
will and probate thereof; (see initial brief, page :22) a!ld,
further, he is barred by the provisions of Section 75~3:.12
U.C.A., 1953, from contesting the will of Ben S~ Brewste1~
or. the -probate of said will (see initial brief~. pag~ ~2-r
All persons claiming under Maude Karren Richards are
estopped to deny the validity of the ''i.II .()£ · Ben ... S.
Brewster (see initial brief, page 24).

is

.

.

.

The agreement entered into by ~laude Karren Rich.:.
ards and Ben S. Brewster is evidenced by a written document, and the reciprocal :wills. executed pursuant thereto
state that they are made pursuant to the written agreement. The Statute of Frauds is therefore fully satisfied.
There was adequate consideration for the reciprocal
will of Maude Karren Richards. She received her distributive share under the will of Ben S. Brewster. It is
only equitable and in accord "\vith good conscience to
enforce her end of the bargain.
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__

W.ill~~ ~uir

Barlow personally and in his capacity
as t:he executor of the later revoking will is a party
defendant in
the civil action below. 'l"'here is no lnerif
to any claim that the civil action is prema tl.ire .
-

. As for the probate matters (Cases Nos. 8682 and
8683), it is the contention of Hoyt W. Brewster, et al.,
that the judgment of the lower court in admitting the
later revoking will to probate should be reversed and
that the earlier reciprocal will of Maude Karren Richards should have been admitted to probate as her irrevocable last will and testament. While there are authorities holding that the later revoking will should he
admitted as the last will and testament of the decendent
and--that the agreement be enforced in equity, there is
excellent authority to the contrary, and certainly under
the circUmstances of this case it would be merely an
empty formality to probate the later revoking 'vill under
which none of the estate would pass.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN
AND RICHARDS

By

Attorneys for
Hoyt W. Brewster, et al.
720 Newhouse Building
Salt ake City, Utah
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